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Abstract
This paper explores optimal environmental tax policy under which
duopoly ¯rms strategically choose the location of their plants in a sim-
ple three-stage game. We examine how the relationship between the
optimal emission tax and the choice of location of duopoly ¯rms af-
fects the welfare of the home country. We characterize the relationship
between the optimal emission tax and the ¯xed cost, depending on the
degree of environmental damage from production. Finally, we show
the existence of asymmetric equilibrium in which either ¯rm chooses
relocation of its plant even if the duopoly ¯rms are identical ex ante.
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1 Introduction
The environmental policy in a game theoretic model has been receiving much
attention in environmental economics. In order to reduce local pollution, the
government imposes a tax on emissions, which may in°uence the location
strategies of polluting ¯rms. This paper describes the interaction of the gov-
ernment and duopoly ¯rms and examines the optimal environmental policy
when the location choice of the ¯rms is endogenous in a three-stage game.
When the environmental policy is stringent, the domestic ¯rms have an
incentive to relocate their plants abroad to reduce the marginal production
cost. The ¯rms face a trade-o® between relocation costs and tax payments.
The improved environment increases welfare of the country, while at the
same time the reduction of tax revenue and pro¯ts of domestic ¯rms decreases
welfare. Therefore, the government sets the environmental policy considering
the location decisions of the domestic ¯rms.
The optimal tax of policy makers who face mobile polluting ¯rms has
been extensively studied in the literature on international trade, tax compe-
tition among governments, and relocation decisions of ¯rms. Among others,
Markusen et al. (1993) analyse decisions of ¯rms on the number and loca-
tion of their plants in response to environmental policies which is given ex-
ogenously. Markusen et al. (1995) examine tax competition in a two-region
model. To determine region's optimal tax rate, they assume that plant lo-
cations are exogenous. Petrakis and Xepapadeas (2003) analyze relocation
decisions of a monopolist under an emission tax and compare welfare under
two policy regimes in which the government can commit to its policy and it
cannot in a three-stage model. They show that welfare under government
commitment to an-ex ante emission tax is higher because the government
can a®ect the monopolist's location decision.
Looking at the real world, many ¯rms face the same environmental policy
in one country, but nevertheless some ¯rms shift their plants abroad and the
others remain in home country. A model of monopolist cannot explain a
phenomenon in which ex-ante homogeneous ¯rms choose di®erent decision
ex post.1 Our objective is to explain this asymmetric outcome found in the
real world.
The study of an asymmetric outcome, in which ¯rms have di®erent choices
under the same environmental policy even though they have identical, is
sparse. Some papers have studied the hybrid outcomes in a framework of
industrial economics and organization and international trade theory. Mills
1Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas (1995) analyze emission taxes under both ¯xed-number
oligopoly and endogenous market structure, but not location decisions of ¯rms.
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and Smith (1996) establish that asymmetric equilibria can exist in a duopoly
with Cournot-Nash game in which ¯rms choose technologies. In the context
of international trade, Yomogida (2007) models a duopoly setting in which
¯rms strategically choose whether to export or to undertake foreign direct
investments and shows the emergence of hybrid equilibrium even if they
have identical cost structure ex ante. These studies, however, assume that
the parameter determining technological choices and tari® rate are given
exogenously.
By introducing endogenous determination of tari® rate, Ohkawa et al.
(2009) examine the relationship between the optimal tari® policy of the host
country and the strategic location choice of foreign duopoly ¯rms. Based on
their model, we assume that the government set its emission tax level taking
into account the strategical behaviour of duopoly ¯rms and commits to the
policy, which gives ¯rms endogenous choice of whether to remain in domestic
country and pay for emission tax or to relocate the plant to foreign country
and pay for ¯xed relocation cost.
In this paper we examine how the domestic government determines the
optimal environmental tax when the government can strategically set its
emission tax rate considering location decisions of duopoly ¯rms in a sim-
ple three-stage game. Another question we address is whether asymmetric
equilibrium emerges. Also we examine how the relationship between the op-
timal emission tax and location choice of duopoly ¯rms a®ects welfare of
home country. Moreover, we describe the relationship between the optimal
emission tax and the ¯xed cost that is one of determinants of relocation of
production.
We derive that the optimal emission tax and welfare resulted from loca-
tion choices of ¯rms depend on the degree of damage from pollution so that
there are various pattern of equilibrium set. When the degree of damage is
su±ciently small, the optimal tax is zero irrespective of the relocation cost.
Subsidies can be optimal without environmental damage from production.
As the degree of damage from pollution increases, asymmetric equilibrium
emerges. That is, the location pattern appears, in which one ¯rm relocates
its plant to foreign country while another remains in home country. When
the environmental damage is large enough, the government attempts to drive
both ¯rms out by setting relative higher emission tax.
Since welfare of domestic country depends on consumer surplus, pro¯ts of
domestic ¯rms, tax revenues and environmental damage, the level of welfare
varies corresponding to the relocation patterns. When both ¯rms remain
in domestic country, the government enjoys pro¯ts and tax revenue from
two ¯rms as well as consumer surplus, while it su®ers from environmental
damage. When either ¯rm relocates its production abroad, bene¯ts from tax
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revenue and pro¯ts decrease while bene¯ts from reduction in damage and
increases in consumer surplus because of price reduction. Therefore, the size
of these opposite force on bene¯ts a®ects the optimal emission tax, which
results in various relocation patterns including asymmetric equilibrium.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents
the basic model and characterizes each stage to derive equilibrium. Section 3
derives the optimal environmental tax and the relationship between resulted
welfare and the ¯xed cost in various degrees of environmental damage. Sec-
tion 4 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider two countries, country H and country F . We assume two identical
¯rms produce and sell a homogeneous good in the market of country H. The
production cost function is assumed to be the same in both countries and
given by C(qi) = cqi, where c is parameter and qi is output of ¯rm i = 1; 2.
The ¯rms face a demand, P (q) = a¡ q, where a denotes the market size and
q is the demand for the product. Pollution is produced per unit of output
in its production process. The damage function is given by D(x) = dx2=2,
where d is a damage coe±cient and x is the total emission in which ¯rms
locate.
Both ¯rms are subject to the environmental policy in country H. Since
we focus on the optimal environmental tax policy under which duopoly ¯rms
choose the location of their plants, without loss of generality, we assume that
there is no active environmental policy in country F . Following Petrakis and
Xepapadeas (2003), we assume that both ¯rms can relocate their production
plants from country H to country F with the cost of relocation, f , and that
the ¯rm exports its product without transportation cost and sells in country
H after the relocation. Its pro¯ts are assumed to remain in country F .
We consider a three-stage game by ¯rms 1 and 2, and the government of
country H. In the ¯rst stage, the government sets an emission tax rate so
as to maximize the welfare of country H. We assume that the government
can commit to an emission tax ex ante. Given the tax rate, in the second
stage, duopoly ¯rms choose the location of their plants. In the third stage,
¯rms compete ¶a la Cournot in the market, given an emission tax rate and
their location choice. We derive a Nash equilibrium of this three-stage game
by using backward induction.
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2.1 Output decision stage
In the last stage, given an emission tax set by the government and the location
choices of each ¯rm in the previous stages, each ¯rm chooses its output to
maximize pro¯ts. First, assume that both ¯rms remain in country H. Firm
i's pro¯t maximization problem is:
max
qi
(a¡ q)qi ¡ cqi ¡ tqi; i = 1; 2;
where t denotes the tax per unit of emissions. From the ¯rst-order condition
and the symmetry assumption, the optimal output of the duopoly ¯rms are
given by:
q1 = q2 =
1
3
(A¡ t); (1)
where A ´ a ¡ c > 0 represents the scale of market. The aggregate output
is q = 2(A¡ t)=3, so that the equilibrium pro¯t of ¯rm i = 1; 2 is:
¼iHH =
1
9
(A¡ t)2 ´ ¼HH : (2)
If both ¯rms relocate their production plants to country F and supply
their products in the market of country H, ¯rm i's pro¯t maximization prob-
lem is given by:
max
qi
(a¡ q)qi ¡ cqi ¡ f; i = 1; 2:
Similarly, the optimal outputs of the duopoly ¯rms are given by:
q1 = q2 =
1
3
A: (3)
The aggregate output is q = 2A=3 and the equilibrium pro¯t of ¯rm i = 1; 2
is:
¼iFF =
1
9
A2 ¡ f ´ ¼FF : (4)
Finally, if ¯rm 1 remains in country H while ¯rm 2 has decided to relocate
its plant in country F , the ¯rst-order conditions of each ¯rm are:
A¡ t¡ (q1 + q2)¡ q1 = 0;
A¡ (q1 + q2)¡ q2 = 0:
Solving the above two equations for q1 and q2 yields the optimal outputs of
the respective ¯rm:
q1 =
1
3
(A¡ 2t) and q2 = 1
3
(A+ t): (5)
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In this case, the aggregate output is q = (2A ¡ t)=3 and the equilibrium
pro¯ts of the respective ¯rms are given by:
¼1HF =
1
9
(A¡ 2t)2 ´ ¼HF and ¼2HF =
1
9
(A+ t)2 ¡ f ´ ¼FH : (6)
We assume that 0 · t < A=2 and f < A2=9 in order to ensure that both
¯rms can coexist in the market.
2.2 Location choice stage
In this stage, the duopoly ¯rms make the relocation decisions given an emis-
sion tax rate in country H and its rival's strategies about the location of
production: strategy H (remain in country H) and strategy F (relocate in
country F ). From (2), (4), and (6), we obtain the payo® matrix depicted in
Table 1.
PPPPPPPPP¯rm 1
¯rm 2
H F
H ¼HH , ¼HH ¼FH , ¼HF
F ¼HF , ¼FH ¼FF , ¼FF
Table 1: The payo® matrix
There are three Nash equilibria: HH, FF, HF (or FH). Let us compare pay-
o®s to derive the conditions for Nash Equilibrium of each case. Given ¯rm
2's strategy H, the condition under which ¯rm 1 has no incentive to relocate
its plant to country F is:
¼HH ¸ ¼FH , f ¸ 4
9
At:
Given ¯rm 2's strategy F, the condition under which ¯rm 1 has no incentive
to remain in country H is:
¼FF ¸ ¼HF , f · 4
9
(A¡ t)t:
Given ¯rm 2's strategy F, the condition under which ¯rm 1 decides to remain
in country H is:
¼HF ¸ ¼FF , f ¸ 4
9
(A¡ t)t:
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Finally, when ¯rm 2 chooses strategy H, the condition under which ¯rm 1
decides to relocate its plant to country F is:
¼FH ¸ ¼HH , f · 4
9
At:
Taken together, we can identify the following three Nash equilibria depending
on the size of f :
Lemma 1 (i) If f < (4=9)(A ¡ t)t, then both ¯rms relocate their plants to
country F . (ii) If (4=9)(A ¡ t)t · f < (4=9)At, then one ¯rm remains in
country H, while another relocates to country F . (iii) If (4=9)At · f , then
both ¯rms remain in country H.
Figure 1 shows the possibilities of three Nash equilibria. De¯ne FHH(t) ´
4At=9 and FHF (t) ´ 4(A¡ t)t=9. Hence, the curve tHH ´ FHH(t)¡1 denotes
the maximum tax rate at which both ¯rms remain in country H and the
curve tHF ´ FHF (t)¡1 denotes the maximum tax rate at which either ¯rm
relocates to country F . When an environmental tax is low and the ¯xed cost
is high, both ¯rm remain in country H, while when an environmental tax
is high and the ¯xed cost is low, both ¯rm relocate their plants to country
F . Since an emission tax increases the marginal cost of production, it is
pro¯table for a ¯rm with low ¯xed cost to relocate in country F . On the
other hand, since the cost of relocation becomes sunk, it is pro¯table for a
¯rm with high relocation cost to remain in country H if an emission tax is
low. When both an emission tax and the ¯xed cost are given at the medium
levels, either of the duopoly ¯rms relocates in country F . In this case, if one
¯rm relocates abroad, relocation of the rival ¯rm reduces the market price,
which in turn reduces the revenue. Hence, the rival ¯rm decides to remain
in country H. In contrast, if one ¯rm chooses production in country H and
decreases its output due to the tax burden, the rival ¯rm can increase its
output, and thus, the revenue resulting from relocation of its production in
country F . In what follows, when a ¯rm is indi®erent between two locations
(i.e. the home country and the foreign country), we assume that this ¯rm
chooses a location that gives a higher welfare for the home country.
2.3 Environmental policy decision stage
The government of country H chooses an emission tax rate t so as to maxi-
mize its economic welfare. However, the welfare is determined by the location
choices of the duopoly ¯rms, which depends on the environmental policy set
by the government. To derive the optimal emission tax rate, ¯rstly, let us
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characterize the welfare of home country associated with Nash equilibrium
in location choices. The welfare of home country when both ¯rms remain in
country H is de¯ned as:
WHH = CSHH + ¼
1
HH + ¼
2
HH ¡D(q) + tq;
where CSHH ´
R q
0
p(s)ds¡p(q)q is consumer surplus in Nash equilibrium HH.
The welfare when one of ¯rms remains in country H and another relocates
in country F is given by:
WHF = CSHF + ¼
i
HF ¡D(qi) + tqi; i = 1; 2:
Note that pro¯t and emission tax of only one ¯rm that remains in country H
and damage cost from emissions of its production in country H are included.
The welfare in case that both ¯rms relocate to country F is:
WFF = CSFF :
Since the pro¯ts of relocated ¯rms remain abroad, the welfare function does
not include the ¯xed cost f .
Substituting (1){(6) into the de¯nitions of welfare above, we obtain three
reduced forms for the welfare in each equilibrium:
WHH(t; d) =
2
9
³
¡ (1 + d)t2 ¡ (1¡ 2d)At+ (2¡ d)A2
´
; (7)
WHF (t; d) =
1
18
³
(6¡ d)A2 ¡ (6¡ 4d)At¡ (3 + 4d)t2
´
; (8)
WFF (t; d) =
2
9
A2: (9)
The welfare functions (7) and (8) are a concave function of t given d,
whereas (9) is constant. The intuition of the ¯gures of welfare functions (7)
and (8) is as follows. Both welfare functions consist of four components:
consumer surplus, pro¯t(s) of domestic ¯rm(s), tax revenue, and damage
cost, three of which are a function of t and damage cost is indirectly a®ected
by the emission tax through a change in domestic production. On one hand,
given d, an increase in t reduces consumer surplus and domestic production,
thus, damage cost and the gross pro¯ts monotonically and its reduction rate
is accelerated as t becomes higher. On the other hand, an increase in t
raises tax revenue when the tax rate is low, and reduces it after the tax rate
exceeds A=4 in the case of HF . When the tax rate is low, the positive e®ect
of an increase in t on tax revenue dominates the marginal reduction of other
components. As the tax rate becomes high, other components decrease at an
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accelerated rate and tax revenue changes to decrease after the tax rate reaches
its threshold, which leads to the concave welfare functions with respect to
the tax rate for any d.
As we will see later, the welfare-maximizing rate in the case HH is higher
than one in the case HF given d. That is, the peak of concave functionWHH
is the right of the peak of concave function WHF . Because the government in
the case HH attempts to obtain higher tax revenue and lower damage cost,
the government sets a higher tax rate until the negative e®ects of reduction
of domestic production and consumer surplus dominate the positive e®ect
of a higher tax rate. In the case HF , the government bears damage cost
and gains tax revenue and pro¯t from only one ¯rm in addition to consumer
surplus a®ected by the aggregate output. In this case, the negative e®ect of
higher tax on consumer surplus dominates the positive e®ect in the smaller
level of tax rate than in the case HH. Thus, given d, the optimal tax rate
in the case HF is smaller than in the case HH.
Consider the e®ect of a change in damage coe±cient on WHH and WHF
given t. Since damage cost is directly a®ected by d, an increase in d must
shift the curves ofWHH andWHF downwards. The government with a higher
d wants to reduce pollution more so as to require lower level of domestic
production than the government with small d . Therefore, the government
attempts to set the higher optimal emission tax, which implies that the wel-
fare functions shift rightward. Combining these e®ect of a change in d on
the welfare, the welfare functions shift downwards to the right as d increases.
The positional relationships among three welfare functions depending on d
are given by Lemma 6-9 (See in Appendices) and illustrated in Figures 2-5.
3 Optimal emission tax and welfare
We now want to ¯gure out the relationship of three welfare functions (7){(9)
with respect to an emission tax rate, given values of damage coe±cient d.
The welfare WHH and WHF maximizing-taxes are respectively given by
etHH(d) = (2d¡ 1)A
2(1 + d)
and etHF (d) = (2d¡ 3)A
3 + 4d
: (10)
Let us compare the welfare. Subtracting (7) from (9) yields WFF ¡WHH =
2
9
g1(t), where
g1(t) ´ (1 + d)t2 ¡ (2d¡ 1)At+ (d¡ 1)A2: (11)
When d < 5=4, g1(t) = 0 has two di®erent real roots, t2 and t5(> t2):
A
¡
2d¡ 1§p5¡ 4d¢ =2(1 + d). Subtracting (8) from (9), we obtain WFF ¡
8
WHF =
1
18
g2(t), where
g2(t) ´ (4d+ 3)t2 ¡ (4d¡ 6)At+ (d¡ 2)A2: (12)
When d < 15=7, g2(t) = 0 has two di®erent real roots, one of which is
negative, t1 and another is positive, t4: A
¡
2d¡ 3§p15¡ 7d¢ =2(1 + d).
Comparing (8) with (7) yields WHH ¡WHF = 118g3(t), where
g3(t) ´ ¡t2 + (4d+ 2)At¡ (3d¡ 2)A2: (13)
In this case, g3(t) = 0 has always two di®erent real roots, t3 and t6(> t3):
A
¡
2d+ 1§p4d2 + d+ 3¢.
3.1 The case of small d
Let us ¯rst examine the case where the damage coe±cient is small or equiv-
alently, the marginal damage from pollution is relatively low. Figure 2 il-
lustrates the optimal emission tax and the resulting welfare that country H
obtains for 0 · d · 2=3. Since WHH is always the largest for 0 · d · 2=3,
the government of country H chooses an emission tax rate so as to maximize
WHH . Thus we have found:
Proposition 2 When 0 · d < 1=2, the negative tax rate (subsidy) on emis-
sion is optimal: t = ¡A=2 for d = 0 and t = tHH(f) for 0 < d < 1=2. When
d = 1=2, the optimal tax rate is zero. When 1=2 < d · 2=3, the government
sets the optimal tax rate according to tHH(f) in the range f 2 [0; ef ], whereef satis¯es etHH = tHH( ef), and it sets a constant tax rate, etHH , for the range
f 2 [ ef; 2A2=9).
If emission has no damage on the environment, the government attempts to
attract both ¯rms by subsidizing emission at the welfare-maximizing rate so
as to obtain the gain from pro¯ts of two ¯rms and a price reduction e®ect.
If environmental damage is not zero, it is not optimal for the government
to subsidize pollution any longer. When the environmental damage from
emission is small enough, WHH is the largest. Therefore, the government
imposes an emission tax according to tHH(f) that is the highest rate for
¯rms to remain in country H, from which tax revenue contributes to the
welfare of country H. When the ¯xed cost reaches ef , the governments sets
the welfare-maximizing rate, etHH and maintains the level for f > ef .
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3.2 The case of medium d
Next, let us look at the case when a damage coe±cient is not su±ciently
large. De¯ne the critical value d¤ such thatWHH(t; d¤) = WHF (t; d¤) = WFF .
That is, when the damage coe±cient is d¤, the welfare takes the same value
for each location pattern. Figure 3 illustrates how the optimal emission tax
is determined in the left panel and the relationship between the optimal
emission tax and the ¯xed cost and the relationship between the maximized
welfare and the ¯xed cost in the right panel when 2=3 < d · d¤. Note that
the pattern of the maximized welfare depending on the ¯xed cost in this case
is di®erent from one in the case of 0 · d · 2=3.
Suppose that the ¯xed cost is f0. If the government sets t0, both ¯rms
remain in country H, which gives country H the welfare WHH(t0). If the
government increases the tax and sets any rate t 2 [tHH(f0); tHF (f0)], either
¯rm chooses relocation so that the government gainsWHF that is larger than
WHH(t0). However, if it sets t > tHF (f0), the welfare reduces toWFF . Hence,
the best strategy is to obtain WHF for country H when f0. Since WHF is
decreasing with t, the government desires to leave a tax rate as lower as
possible so as to attain larger WHF . Thus, the optimal tax is tHH(f0), under
the assumption that the ¯rm chooses the location that gives the government
the largest welfare when a ¯rm is indi®erent between two locations.
Suppose that the ¯xed cost is f3. If the government sets t > tHH(f3),
the welfare becomesWHF (t) orWFF , which is strictly smaller thanWHH(t3).
Hence, the optimal tax rate is t3 = tHH(f3). Until the ¯xed cost approachesef that satis¯es etHH = tHH( ef), it is optimal to set a tax according the curve
tHH(f). Since the welfare WHH decreases with t > etHH , it is optimal to
maintain an emission tax at etHH for f ¸ ef . Thus we have found:
Proposition 3 For 2=3 < d · d¤, the optimal tax rate is (i) tHH(f) if
f 2 [0; ef ]; (ii) etHH if f 2 [ ef; 2A2=9).
Until the degree of damage reaches the critical value at which the welfare of
all patterns of location are the same, WHF (t) is the largest for f 2 [0; f3].
The government sets an emission tax to induces either ¯rm to relocate its
plant to country F . When the tax rate is in the range, [0; tHH(f3)], WHF
decreases with t for any f . Hence, the government sets tHH(f), at which two
locations are indi®erent for each ¯rm. In the location pattern of HF with
small degree of environmental damage, an increase in consumer surplus of
price reduction due to low tax rate dominates a reduction in pro¯ts and tax
revenue from one ¯rm. For f ¸ f3, the government sets tax rate according
to the curve tHH(f) so as to attract both ¯rms to country H. In this range,
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the government enjoys tax revenue and a reduction in damage cost due to an
increased emission tax corresponding to an increased ¯xed cost unless either
¯rm decides to relocate its production. When the ¯xed cost reaches ef , the
government ¯xes emission tax at etHH that maximizes welfare in the case of
HH. If the ¯xed cost is higher than ef , both ¯rms are reluctant to relocate
their production even if the tax rate increases. However, setting tax rate too
high reduces the pro¯t of ¯rms. This reduction in the pro¯t dominates the
bene¯t of the increased tax revenue. Thus, it is optimal for the government
to ¯xed emission tax at etHH for f ¸ ef .
Consider next the case of d¤ < d < 5=4. Note that when d < 5=4, there
exists tax rates such that WFF < WHH and WFF < WHF from (11) and
(12). As Figure 4 shows, for f 2 [0; f4], where f4 satis¯es t4 = tHH(f4),
the government obtains the largest welfare WHF by setting tax rate tHH(f),
under which only one ¯rm relocate to suit the government's purpose. Once
the ¯xed cost exceeds f4, WHF is smaller than WFF for f 2 (f4; f2], where f2
satis¯es t2 = tHH(f2). Hence, the government attempts to keep both ¯rms
away from home country. The government suddenly increases the tax rate
up to tHF (f) (at the point a in Figure 4). When the ¯xed cost reaches f2,
the government desires both ¯rms to stay in home country. The government
suddenly reduces the tax to tHH(f) (at the point b). For f 2 [f2; ef ], the
government sets a tax rate along the curve tHH(f) and ¯xes the welfare-
maximizing rate etHH for f > ef due to decreasing WHH with respect to t. We
may summarize the above:
Proposition 4 For d¤ < d < 5=4, the optimal tax rate is (i) tHH(f) if
f 2 [0; f4]; (ii ) tHF (f) if f 2 [f4; f2]; (iii) tHH(f) if f 2 [f2; ef ]; (iv) etHH
if f 2 [ ef; 2A2=9).
When the degree of damage is medium, the relationship between the optimal
tax rate and the ¯xed cost is complicated. For relatively small ¯xed costs,
f 2 [0; f4], the government attracts only one ¯rm to bear damage from its
production and to obtain bene¯ts from tax revenue and pro¯ts of one ¯rm.
Since a higher emission tax rate reduces consumer surplus and domestic
production and this cost dominates the positive e®ect of an increased tax on
a reduction in damage cost, the government sets the lowest tax rate such that
only one ¯rm relocates, which is tHH(f) from the assumption. For the middle
level of the ¯xed cost, f 2 [f4; f2], the government sets tHF (f) to keep both
¯rms away from the home country. The government enjoys bene¯ts from
the improved environment and a price reduction although it sacri¯ces tax
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revenues and pro¯ts. Once the ¯xed cost exceed f2, the government can
set a relatively high emission tax tHH(f) on both ¯rms in country H to
obtain increased tax revenue because the large cost of relocation becomes
heavy burden for the ¯rms so that both ¯rms are reluctant to relocate their
production under t · tHH(f). Since t > tHH( ef) reduces WHH through
reduction in aggregate production, the government maintains etHH for f > ef .
Let us consider the case of 5=4 < d · 15=7. Figure 5 illustrates the
relationships between the optimal tax, the maximized welfare and the ¯xed
cost of two cases in which the degrees of damage is relatively large. The
upper panel shows the case of 5=4 · d · 2. In this case, for f 2 [0; f4], the
government attempts to induce only one ¯rm to relocate because WHF is the
largest. WhileWHF increases with t for t 2 [0;etHF ], it decreases with t for t 2
[etHF ; t4], where t4 = tHH(f4). Hence, until the ¯xed cost reaches efHF , which
satis¯es etHF = tHF ( efHF ), it is desirable for the government to set an emission
tax according to the curve tHF (f) and maintain the welfare-maximizing rateetHF for f 2 [ efHF ; efHH ], where efHH satis¯es etHF = tHH( efHH). However,
when the ¯xed cost exceeds efHH , the welfare WHF decreases with t due to
the negative e®ect on production, thus on pro¯t of domestic ¯rm, which
induces the government to lower the tax to tHH(f). Note that if both ¯rms
remain in country H, the welfare drastically decreases to WHH so that the
government avoids both ¯rms remain in the home country. Once the ¯xed
cost exceeds f4, the welfare WHF is smaller than WFF . The government
attempts to drive both ¯rms out so as to raise the tax up to tHF (f).
The lower panel shows the case of 2 < d · 15=7. For f 2 [0; f1], WFF is
the largest. Hence, the government sets tHF (f) to drive both ¯rms out. For
f 2 [f1; efHF ], the government sets tax rate according to the curve tHF (f),
which yields WHF . For f 2 [ efHF ; efHF ], the government sets etHF to obtain
the maximized WHF . For the cases of f 2 [ efHF ; f4] and f 2 [f4; 2A2=9], the
government takes the same strategies to those in the case of 5=4 · d · 2 as
described above. We may summarize the above argument as the following
proposition:
Proposition 5 For 5=4 · d · 15=7, the optimal tax rate is (i) tHF (f) if f 2
[0; efHF ], where efHF satis¯es etHF = tHF ( efHF ); (ii ) etHF if f 2 [ efHF ; efHH ],
where efHH satis¯es etHF = tHH( efHH); (iii) tHH(f) if f 2 [ efHH ; f4]; (iv)
tHF (f) if f 2 [f4; 2A2=9).
In the case of large degree of damage, WHH is the lowest. The environmen-
tal damage from the aggregate production of two ¯rms is so large that the
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government avoids to attract both ¯rms. When damage is enough small for
country H to allow one ¯rm to remain and the ¯xed cost is relative low,
the government sets tHF (f) to attract only one ¯rm and enjoys the bene¯t
of tax revenue and a pro¯t from one domestic ¯rm and reduction in price.
Until the ¯xed cost reaches efHF , an increase in tax has positive e®ect on
tax revenue and a reduction in damage cost, the government raises emis-
sion tax corresponding to increasing ¯xed cost. As the burden of the ¯xed
cost becomes heavier, a domestic ¯rm does not choose relocation when an
emission tax is relatively low, which gives the government an incentive to
raise the tax in order to obtain WHF . Once the ¯xed cost exceeds efHF , the
government enjoys the maximized welfare WHF . For the larger ¯xed costs
than efHH , the welfare-maximizing tax etHF induces both ¯rms to remain in
country H. Since damage cost from the production of two ¯rms is so large,
the government raises the emission tax in order to drive only one ¯rm out.
The welfare WHF decreases as tax rate increases, the government sets the
lowest tax that induces one ¯rm to relocate its production, according to the
curve tHH(f). When the ¯xed cost reaches f4, the government sets tHF (f)
to drive two ¯rms out. In the lower case of Figure 5, for the lower ¯xed cost,
the government attempts to drive both ¯rms out because tax revenue is too
small to compensate large damage from pollution.2
4 Globalization and economic welfare
We may consider the location cost, f , as a degree of globalization of world
economy. That is, the more globalization grows, the lower f is. When the
damage coe±cient, d, is small, the location pattern of two ¯rms, (H;H),
remains unchanged even if f decreases. Given d 2 [0; 1=2], the welfare that
the country H gains is maximized for a nonpositive tax rate. When d is in
the range of (1=2; 2=3], the welfare, WHH , decreases as f becomes smaller.
In this case, if the government sets a welfare-maximizing tax, a ¯rm with
small f relocates its production to the foreign country, which reduces the
welfare. To avoid the reduction in the welfare due to relocation of ¯rms, the
government sets a lower tax according to the curve, tHH(f).
When d is large, the welfare, WFF is the largest for various f . Hence,
the governments raises the tax to gain WFF , which is independent of f .
For the governments with high sensibility to the environmental quality, the
production of polluting ¯rms outside gives the largest welfare regardless of
2In the case of large damage, d > 15=7, the government sets tHF (f) for any f to lead
both ¯rms to relocate their production abroad, because bene¯ts from tax revenue and
pro¯ts no longer o®set huge environmental damage.
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the degree of globalization.
When the damage coe±cient is medium, the relationship between glob-
alization and economic welfare shows various patterns with respect to d.
Firstly, when d is in the range of (2=3; d¤], the equilibrium location pattern
changes from (H;H) to (H;F ) as the globalization proceeds. If t is small, the
e®ect of tax revenue is small (tax revenue e®ect is zero when t = 0) so that the
e®ect of a reduction in environmental damage due to relocation of one ¯rm
dominates reductions in tax revenue and pro¯ts. As a result, WHF > WHH .
When the relocation cost decrease cross the ~f , the welfare-maximizing tax,etHH induces ¯rms to relocate abroad. Hence, the government lowers the tax
rate corresponding to the globalization grows so as to attract both ¯rms in
country H. When the location cost decreases cross f3, the location pattern
that maximizes the welfare is (H;F ). As f decreases, the tax rate that
induces only one ¯rm to relocate shifts lower. Since WHF is a decreasing
function of t > 0, a reduction in the tax rate increases the welfare. When d
is in the range of (d¤; 5=4), the equilibrium location pattern (F; F ) appears
during it changes from (H;H) to (H;F ) as f2 decreases to f4. In the case of
2=3 < d < 5=4, the welfare decreases ¯rst, then increases as the globalization
proceeds.
When the damage coe±cient is relatively large and in the range of [5=4; 2],
the equilibrium location pattern changes from (F; F ) to (H;F ) as the glob-
alization grows. The environmental damage is too large to maximize WHH .
When the tax rate is small, the marginal cost of a domestic ¯rm is not so
high, which contribute to consumer surplus. In addition, under the location
pattern (H;F ), tax revenue contributes to the welfare. The bene¯t of a small
tax on consumer surplus and a pro¯t besides tax revenue dominates the en-
vironmental damage, which leads to a larger WHF than WFF . According
to the growing globalization, the government lowers the tax so as to obtain
WHF . Since the welfare-maximizing tax rate for the location pattern (H;F )
is in the range of [0; t4], the equilibrium welfare increases and then decreases
as the globalization proceeds. It is interesting to note that the degree of
globalization reverses the change of welfare.
5 Conclusions
This paper explores the optimal environmental tax policy under which duopoly
¯rms strategically choose the location of their plants in a simple three-stage
game. In the ¯rst stage, the government sets an emission tax rate to maxi-
mize the country's welfare. Given the tax rate, in the second stage, duopoly
¯rms choose the location of their plants. In the third stage, ¯rms compete
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¶a la Cournot in the market, given an emission tax rate and their location
choice. In this setting, we show how the optimal environmental tax is deter-
mined when the government can a®ect the strategies of duopoly ¯rms about
relocation which, in turn, depends on endogenous emission tax rate.
We derive that the optimal emission tax and welfare resulted from loca-
tion choices of ¯rms depend on the degree of damage from pollution, which
a®ects bene¯ts from pro¯ts of ¯rms, tax revenue, and price reduction and
cost from environmental damage. Under some range of damage coe±cient,
hybrid equilibrium emerges. That is, either ¯rm chooses relocation of its
plant even if duopoly ¯rms are identical ex ante.
Appendices
Lemma 6 For 0 · d · 2=3, WHH is the largest if 0 · t · A=2. For
0 · d · 1=2, WHH is maximized at t = 0. For 1=2 < d · 2=3, WHH is
maximized at t = etHH .
Proof. When d = 0, we have WFF < WHF (0) < WHH(0) and WHF (A=2) <
WFF < WHH(A=2). Since welfare-maximizing taxes, etHH and etHF are nega-
tive, WHH is largest in t 2 [0; A=2) and is maximized at t = 0 for this range.
In the case that d = 1=2, WHH is maximized at etHH = 0. Since etHF < 0
and WHF (A=2) < WFF < WHH(A=2), WHH is largest in 0 < t < A=2. In
the case that d = 2=3, WHH and WHF intersect at t = 0, hence, t3 = 0
with etHH > 0 and etHF < 0. Since WHF (A=2) < WFF < WHH(A=2), WHH is
largest in 0 < t < 2=3.
Lemma 7 For 2=3 < d · d¤, WHF is largest if 0 · t · t3, while WHH is
the largest if t3 < t < t5 and is maximized at t = etHH .
Proof. This follows directly from Lemma 6.
Lemma 8 For d¤ · d < 5=4, WHF is largest if 0 · t · t4, WFF is largest
in t4 < t < t2, WHH is largest if t2 < t < t6 and is maximized at t = etHH .
Proof. Since g3(t) = 0 if only if WHH = WHF , we can rewrite as:
G (t(d); d) = ¡t2 + (4d+ 2)At¡ (3d¡ 2)A2 ´ 0:
By the implicit function theorem, we have:
t
0
(d) = ¡Gd
Gt
; (14)
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where the subscripts denote partial derivatives. Because g3(t) = 0 is quadratic
function of t and t3 is its smaller roots, the sign of Gt(¢) at t = t3 must be
positive. By assumption of t < A=2, we have Gd = 4A (t¡ (3=4)A) < 0:
Hence, from (14), t
0
(d) > 0.
Next, looking at the slope of WHF at t = t3, again by assumption of
t < A=2, @WHF=@d = ¡(2t ¡ A)2 < 0: Combining this with t0(d) > 0, for
d > d¤, we have:
WFF = WHF (t(d
¤); d¤) > WHF (t(d); d¤) > WHF (t(d); d) :
This shows that the intersection of WHH and WHF is below the function
WFF .
Lemma 9 For 5=4 · d · 2, WHF is the largest if 0 · t · t4, while WFF
is the largest if t4 < t < A
2=2. For 2 < d · 15=7, WFF is the largest if
0 < t · t1 or t4 < t < A2=2, while WHF is the largest if t1 < t · t4.
Proof. In this case, there is no possibility that WHH is maximum since
WHH does not intersect WFF from (11). When 5=4 · d · 2, WHF is largest
because t1 · 0 and 0 < t4 < A=2. When 2 < d · 15=7, WFF is largest for
the ranges of t 2 [0; t1] or t4 < t < A=2, and WHF is largest for t1 < t < t4.
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